- Case
- RADHAKRISNA SHET., v. VITHAL KRISHNA PARAB AND 5 ORS., (Bombay High Court, 21-03-2025)
- Law
- Land Acquisition Act, Code of Civil Procedure, Limitation Act.
Facts: The appellant filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction against the respondents, alleging encroachment on his land by illegal structures. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the defendants proved the existence of cowsheds prior to 2006 and the plaintiffs failed to prove their cause of action. The appellant then filed a First Appeal along with an application for condonation of delay of 1483 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The First Appellate Court dismissed the application, unconvinced by the justification for the delay. The appellant then filed a Second Appeal before the High Court. The appellant claimed the delay was due to reliance on his advocate's advice and subsequent land acquisition proceedings.
Procedural Posture: This is a Second Appeal filed in the High Court of Bombay at Goa, challenging the order of the First Appellate Court, which had dismissed the appellant's application for condonation of delay in filing the First Appeal against the trial court's dismissal of his suit.
Issue: Did the First Appellate Court err in dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 1483 days in filing the First Appeal? Specifically, did the appellant demonstrate "sufficient cause" for the delay as required under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
Holding: No, the High Court found no legal infirmity in the First Appellate Court's order and dismissed the Second Appeal, upholding the rejection of the condonation of delay application.
Reasoning: The High Court considered the principles laid down by the Apex Court regarding condonation of delay, particularly in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), emphasizing that while a liberal approach is warranted to advance substantial justice, it cannot defeat the law of limitation. The Court noted the applicant's "calculated approach" in awaiting the outcome of land acquisition proceedings before pursuing the appeal. The Court found the delay was not bona fide and did not constitute "sufficient cause," as the applicant was aware of the dismissal of the civil suit and took a calculated risk by delaying the appeal. The Court also reiterated the principle of vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, stating that the law assists only those who are diligent in pursuing their remedies.
