- Case
- SACHIN DHONDIRAM CHAVAN v. TRUPTI SACHIN CHAVAN (Bombay High Court, 26-03-2025)
- Law
- Constitution of India, Hindu Marriage Act, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, Family Courts Act.
Facts: A husband and wife initially filed for divorce based on cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA). Subsequently, they jointly filed an application to convert the petition to one for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the HMA. As part of the consent terms, the wife transferred her rights in a flat to the husband and withdrew domestic violence proceedings against him. Shortly after, the husband sought to withdraw his consent for the mutual divorce. His stated reason was his desire to reconcile, but the Family Court found this to be malafide.
Procedural Posture: The husband filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the Family Court's order rejecting his application to withdraw consent for divorce by mutual consent. The High Court was reviewing the legality and validity of the Family Court's order.
Issue: Can a party unilaterally withdraw consent for a divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, particularly after the other party has acted upon the consent terms to their detriment?
Holding: No, a party cannot unilaterally withdraw consent for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, especially when the other party has already acted upon the consent terms to their detriment. The High Court upheld the Family Court's decision.
Reasoning: The Court relied on previous decisions, including Prakash Alumal Kalandari v. Jahnani Prakash Kalandari and Rajesh Pratap Sainani v. Bhavna Rajesh Sainani, to establish that a party is estopped from withdrawing consent if the other party has acted on the consent terms. The Court emphasized that the wife had transferred property and withdrawn legal proceedings based on the husband's initial consent. Allowing the husband to withdraw his consent after benefiting from these actions would be unjust and inequitable. The Court also noted the husband's conduct was malafide, as he sought to withdraw consent shortly after receiving the benefits of the consent terms. The court stated, "Thus, it is clear that not only the conduct of the Petitioner is malafide but the same amounts to interference in the administration of justice". The Court found no sufficient or just cause for allowing the husband to withdraw his consent and emphasized that the wife would suffer irreversible prejudice if the withdrawal were permitted.
