- Case
- SITA RAM v. THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH (Supreme Court of India, 06-03-2025)
- Law
- Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, Code of Criminal Procedure.
Indian Penal Code, 1860: The judgment discusses Sections 34, 304, 323, 324, 451, 504, 505 and 506 of the IPC. Section 34 IPC (common intention) is discussed in the context of charges framed against the accused, specifically regarding house trespass, voluntarily causing hurt, intentional insult, criminal intimidation, and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Section 304 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) is mentioned as the offence the High Court ultimately found the appellant Sita Ram guilty of. Section 323 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt) and Section 451 IPC (house-trespass) are mentioned as the offences the High Court found the appellant Onkar Singh guilty of. Sections 451, 324, 504, 506 and 304 read with Section 34 of the IPC are mentioned in the context of the original FIR lodged by the deceased and the charges framed by the trial court. The judgment does not provide detailed analysis or interpretation of these sections beyond their application to the facts of the case.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872: The judgment extensively discusses Section 32 of the Evidence Act, specifically concerning the admissibility of the First Information Report (FIR) lodged by the deceased as a dying declaration. The counsel for the appellant argued that the FIR could not be treated as a dying declaration because the cause of death (asphyxia) had no proximate connection with the actus reus of the accused (head injuries), and because there was no expectancy of death when the FIR was lodged. The court refers to Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, which states that statements made by a person as to the cause of their death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in their death, are relevant whether the person was under expectation of death or not. The court also cites Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others, stating that Section 32 does not require the statement to have been made in imminent expectation of death, but the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence. The court ultimately finds no merit in the appellant's submissions, implying that the FIR was admissible as a dying declaration.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Section 154 Cr.P.C. is mentioned in the context of the "FIRST INFORMATION REPORT" heading. The judgment does not provide detailed analysis or interpretation of this section beyond its application to the facts of the case.
