ASHAPURA MINECHEM LTD v. INDIAN BUREAU OF MINES THR MINSTRY AND ORS
Discusses interpretation of statutes, retrospective application of laws, and fundamental rights in the context of mining law.
Court: Bombay High Court
Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:22567-DB
Decision Date: 06-06-2025
List of Laws
Article 226 of the Constitution of India; Articles 13, 14, 19(1)(g), 21, 31-B of the Constitution of India; Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; Mineral Concession Rules, 1960; Environment Protection Act, 1986; The Forest Conservation Act, 1980; Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 1994; General Principles of Law
- Article 226 of the Constitution of India: The judgment refers to Article 226 as the basis for the Writ Petition, under which the petitioner seeks various writs including certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The petitioner seeks these writs to quash orders, directions, and letters issued by the respondents, and to direct the respondents to provide the petitioner with a mine code. The court is called upon to adjudicate the validity and legality of the petitioner's claim under Article 226.
- Articles 13, 14, 19(1)(g), 21, 31-B of the Constitution of India: The petitioner contends that the retrospective application of Section 4-A of the Mines & Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, as amended in 2021, violates their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner also argues that Rule 8(4) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 2016, violates their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21, and is contrary to Article 13. The respondents argue that the Mines Act is part of the Ninth Schedule, making Article 31-B applicable, thus precluding claims of infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and/or 19. The court notes that the concept of equality under Article 14 is a positive concept and cannot be enforced negatively.
- Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The judgment extensively discusses the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act). Section 3(ae): Defines "mineral concession". Section 4: States that prospecting or mining operations must be under a license or lease. Section 4A: Deals with the termination of prospecting licenses, exploration licenses, or mining leases. The petitioner argues that the amendment to Section 4A(4), substituting "mining activity" with "production and dispatch," should not be applied retrospectively. The court analyzes the provision as it existed before and after the amendment. The court also discusses the time taken by government authorities to pass revival orders and whether that time should be excluded from the period stipulated under Section 4A. Section 5: Restricts the grant of mineral concessions, requiring previous approval of the Central Government for minerals specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule. The court emphasizes that the approval of the Central Government is mandatory and requires compliance with all stipulated conditions. Section 5(1): Discussed in the context of the Central Government's prior approval for granting a mining lease. The court notes that the prior approval issued under Section 5 was conditional and required compliance with other statutory conditions, such as obtaining environmental clearance. Section 9A(2)(c): Discussed in relation to the lapsing of the mining lease due to non-compliance with conditions. The court notes that the lease lapsed by operation of law under Section 9A(2)(c) and could not be revived. Section 10A: This section, inserted by the 2015 amendment, is central to the proceedings. The court analyzes sub-clause (c) of sub-section (2), which states that mining leases shall be granted subject to fulfillment of conditions of previous approval or letter of intent within two years from the date of the amendment (12 January 2015). The court emphasizes that this provision provides a cut-off date of 11 January 2017, which is non-negotiable. The court also refers to Section 10A(2)(d) which states that areas where the right to obtain a license or lease has lapsed under clause (b) and (c), such areas shall be put up for auction. Section 10A(2)(c): The petitioner argues that the letter/order issued by the respondent no.5 dated 11 January 2017 was only for compliances with LOI before 11 January 2017 and upon such completion a grant order is to issue in respect of the mining lease and not for registration or execution of the mining lease. The petitioner also argues that Rule 8(4) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 is inconsistent with Section 10A(2)(c) of the amended Mines Act. Section 19: States that mining leases granted beyond 11.01.2017 on the mineral concessions covered under Section 10A(2)(c) as it would be treated to be ab-initio void under Section 19 of the Act for being in contravention of the Act. Section 24: The Central Government exercises powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (10 of 2015), to remove the difficulties relating to fulfillment of conditions laid in the letter of intent.
- Mineral Concession Rules, 1960: The judgment refers to the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, in the context of compliance with applicable allied laws.
- Environment Protection Act, 1986: The judgment mentions the Environment Protection Act, 1986, in the context of mandatory compliance with its provisions and rules, including obtaining Environmental Clearance (EC). The petitioner's failure to obtain EC is a recurring theme in the judgment. The court refers to notifications issued under the Environment (Protection) Act 1986) (29 of 1986).
- The Forest Conservation Act, 1980: The judgment mentions the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, in the context of mandatory compliance with its provisions.
- Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 1994: The judgment refers to the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 1994, as issued and amended by the Ministry, in the context of mandatory compliance with its provisions.
- General Principles of Law: The judgment refers to the doctrine of Separation of Powers, stating that to call upon the Court to undertake such exercise would tantamount to exercising powers within legislative domain, which is constitutionally impermissible under the recognized doctrine of Separation of Powers which forms part of the basic structure theory as propounded in the Kesavananda Bharati case. The judgment also refers to the principle that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all.
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