BAPU VITTHAL BACHHAV DEC THR. LRS. A) MANGAL BAPU BACHCHAV AND B) ANIKET BAPU BACHCHAV AND ANR. v. ARBITRATOR AND ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ORS.
Discusses the scope of judicial review under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
Court: Bombay High Court
Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:22588
Decision Date: 09-06-2025
List of Laws
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Land Acquisition Act, 1894; The National Highways Act, 1956; Constitution of India, 1949; General Principles of Law
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: The judgment discusses Section 34, which pertains to challenging an arbitral award. It highlights that a Section 34 court can either set aside or uphold an arbitral award, but it cannot modify the award to remedy errors. The judgment also mentions Section 37, which deals with appeals against judgments made under Section 34. It states that interference under Section 37 cannot exceed the restrictions laid down under Section 34. The court clarifies that the jurisdiction in appeal under Section 37 is limited to what has been conferred under Section 34. The judgment refers to previous cases to support the view that Section 34 jurisdiction is not one in which a statutory entitlement can be executed if it was not part of the arbitral award.
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The judgment discusses Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which provides for solatium, an enhancement of compensation payable for compulsory land acquisition. The judgment notes that the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh held that solatium under Section 23(2) is payable for land acquisition under the Highways Act between 1997 and the introduction of the 2013 Acquisition Act. The judgment also refers to Sections 23(1-A) and 28, stating that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in these sections will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act.
- The National Highways Act, 1956: The judgment discusses Section 3G(1) of the Highways Act, which states that compensation payable for land acquisition for a national highway is to be determined by the "competent authority". If the amount of compensation is not acceptable, the compensation is to be determined by the arbitrator appointed under Section 3G(5) of the Highways Act. The judgment extensively discusses Section 3J of the Highways Act, which stated that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall apply to an acquisition under the Highways Act. The Supreme Court struck down Section 3J as unconstitutional in Tarsem Singh, holding that acquisitions between 1997 and 2015 would be treated as if Section 3J did not exist.
- Constitution of India, 1949: The judgment mentions Article 14 of the Constitution of India, stating that Section 3J of the National Highways Act is violative of Article 14 and, therefore, unconstitutional. The judgment also refers to Article 136, noting that the Supreme Court declined to interfere with orders granting solatium and interest, given its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136. The judgment also mentions Article 142 in the context of the petitioners potentially approaching the Supreme Court.
- General Principles of Law: The judgment discusses the principle that a court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot modify an arbitral award. It can only set aside or uphold it. The judgment also discusses the principle that the scope of review under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not a full appellate review but a review within the narrow confines of Section 34. The judgment also touches upon the fundamental policy of Indian law, particularly the obligation to pay solatium to land-losers whose lands were compulsorily acquired.
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