DANESH SINGH v. HAR PYARI (DEAD) THR. LRS.
Lis Pendens and Execution Proceedings: Supreme Court Clarifies Rights of Pendente Lite Transferees, Applicability of Section 52 TPA and Order XXI CPC.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: 2025 INSC 1434
Decision Date: 15-12-2025
List of Laws
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Section 52); Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Order XXI Rules 58, 89, 90, 92, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104; Section 47); Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 127, Article 128); Constitution of India (Article 142)
- Facts: In 1970, Duli Chand mortgaged property to New Bank of India for a loan. The bank sued for recovery in 1982, obtaining an ex-parte decree in 1984. During the pendency of the bank's suit, but before the decree, Har Pyari and another purchased a portion of the mortgaged property in 1985. The bank then moved for execution, and the entire mortgaged property was auctioned in 1988, purchased by Danesh Singh and others. Har Pyari and another filed a suit in 1989 seeking a declaration that the auction sale was void. The Trial Court declared the sale void, which was upheld by the Appellate Court and the High Court. Danesh Singh and others appealed to the Supreme Court.
- Procedural Posture: This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which dismissed the appellants' second appeal, thereby affirming the judgments of the lower courts that had held the respondents' suit to be maintainable. The Supreme Court granted leave and heard the appeal.
- Issue: (1) Is the transfer of the suit property to the respondents hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Lis Pendens)? (2) Could the respondents have sought relief under Order XXI Rules 89 or 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) before the Executing Court? (3) Were the respondents "third parties" who could institute a separate suit under Order XXI Rule 92(4) CPC? (4) Were the respondents "representatives of the judgment-debtor" such that Section 47 CPC would bar a separate suit? (5) Should the respondents have sought the remedy available under Rule 99 read with Rules 100 to 102 of Order XXI CPC, and if so, does the failure to do so affect the maintainability of a separate suit?
- Holding: (1) Yes, the transfer is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (2) No, the respondents could not have obtained effective relief under Order XXI Rules 89 or 90 CPC. (3) No, the respondents were not "third parties" who could institute a separate suit under Order XXI Rule 92(4) CPC. (4) Yes, the respondents were "representatives of the judgment-debtor," and Section 47 CPC applies. (5) Yes, the respondents should have sought the remedy under Rule 99, but the bar under Rule 102 applies to them as pendente lite transferees.
- Reasoning: The Court held that the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies because the bank's suit directly and specifically questioned the right to the mortgaged property. The respondents, as purchasers during the pendency of the bank's suit, are bound by the outcome. The Court also found that the respondents were not "third parties" under Order XXI Rule 92(4) CPC, as they were representatives of the judgment-debtor. While the respondents could have applied under Rule 99 CPC after dispossession, Rule 102 bars such relief for pendente lite transferees. The Court emphasized that the executing court has broad powers to adjudicate disputes and that allowing a separate suit would circumvent the established procedures and limitation periods. The Court allowed the appeal, but directed the appellants to pay Rs. 75,00,000 to the respondents in the interest of justice, considering the long passage of time since the original transaction.
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