SHRI. UDAY BHANUDAS GUJAR v. SHRI. MADAN YESHWANT DIWAN AND ORS.
Jurisdictional Limits under the Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act: Divisional Commissioner's Power to Review Sale Permission after Execution of Sale Deed.
Court: Bombay High Court
Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:56225
Decision Date: 19-12-2025
List of Laws
Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act, 1999; Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966
- Facts: Respondent No.6, the original landowner, obtained permission under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act, 1999, to sell land to the petitioner. Respondent No.4, the competent authority, granted this permission on December 13, 2010. Subsequently, a registered sale deed was executed on March 31, 2011, and possession was transferred to the petitioner. Later, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, claiming rights based on an unenforced 1995 agreement to sell with Satish Tanksale, appealed the sale permission to the Divisional Commissioner (Respondent No. 5). This appeal was filed with a delay that was not condoned.
- Procedural Posture: The Divisional Commissioner entertained the appeal and cancelled the sale permission, citing suppression of the earlier agreement. The petitioner challenged this cancellation order before the High Court by way of a writ petition, arguing that the Divisional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The High Court issued a rule in the petition.
- Issue: Did the Divisional Commissioner have the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal and cancel the sale permission granted under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act, 1999, after the permission had been acted upon, a registered sale deed executed, and possession transferred?
- Holding: No, the Divisional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction. The High Court set aside the Divisional Commissioner's order, restoring the original sale permission and validating the registered sale deed in favor of the petitioner.
- Reasoning: The Court reasoned that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for an appellate remedy against an order granting permission under Section 12. The authority granting permission acts as a designated authority under the special enactment, not as a revenue officer under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Citing Fulchand Bhagwandas Gugale v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 1 SCC 193, the Court emphasized that when an officer functions under a special statute, their powers are limited to that statute. The Court also noted the procedural infirmity of the Divisional Commissioner proceeding on the merits of the appeal without first condoning the delay. Furthermore, the Court stated that once the permission was acted upon and a registered sale deed came into existence, the statutory authority became functus officio, lacking the power to review or recall the permission. The Court held that the existence of an agreement to sell does not create any right, title, or interest in immovable property.
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