Facts: A dispute arose from a Memorandum of Family Settlement, leading to arbitration. Respondent No. 2 applied for an extension of time under Section 29A before the Commercial Court. Subsequently, due to the resignation of the presiding arbitrator, Respondent No. 2 also filed an application under Section 11 before the High Court for the appointment of an arbitrator, which was allowed. The Commercial Court then allowed the Section 29A application. Respondent No. 1 challenged the Commercial Court's jurisdiction, arguing that the High Court's appointment of the arbitrator under Section 11 ousted the Commercial Court's power to extend time under Section 29A. The Single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench due to conflicting judgments on the interpretation of "Court" under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Division Bench held that the application under Section 29A(4) was not maintainable before the Commercial Court. The Single Judge then quashed the Commercial Court's order, allowing the parties to approach the High Court for an extension. The appellant contends that the Commercial Court alone is the appropriate Court under Section 29A read with Section 2(1)(e).
Procedural Posture: The case reached the Supreme Court of India via a Civil Appeal arising out of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Goa and the subsequent order of a Single Judge of the same High Court.
Issue: When an arbitral tribunal is constituted either by the High Court under Section 11(6) or by agreement of the parties under Section 11(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the tribunal fails to complete proceedings within the stipulated time, which court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for extension of time under Section 29A: the High Court or the Civil Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act?
Holding: The Supreme Court held that the 'Court' under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for the purpose of extending the time limit for arbitral awards, is the Civil Court of original jurisdiction as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal was constituted by the High Court under Section 11(6) or by the parties' agreement under Section 11(2). The High Court's power under Section 11 is exhausted upon the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
Reasoning: The Court reasoned that the definition of "Court" in Section 2(1)(e) should be strictly adhered to unless the context explicitly requires otherwise. The Court rejected the argument that allowing a Civil Court to extend the mandate of an arbitrator appointed by the High Court would create a hierarchical anomaly or conflict of power. The Court emphasized that Section 11 pertains to the appointment of arbitrators, while Section 29A deals with the conduct of arbitral proceedings and the making of the award. Once the arbitrator is appointed under Section 11, the High Court becomes functus officio with respect to the arbitral proceedings, and the power to extend time under Section 29A vests in the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e). The Court also clarified that Section 42 of the Act does not alter this position, as the High Court's role in appointing the arbitrator does not make it the "Court" for all subsequent applications.