S. NAGESH v. SHOBHA S. ARADHYA
Cognizance under Section 138 NI Act: Delay Condonation Must Precede Taking Cognizance; Complaint Quashed.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: 2026 INSC 27
Decision Date: 06-01-2026
List of Laws
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Order XLI Rules 3A and 5(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
- Facts: Shobha S. Aradhya (respondent) filed a complaint against S. Nagesh (appellant) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, alleging that a cheque issued by him was dishonored. There was a delay of two days in filing the complaint. The Magistrate initially took cognizance of the offence and later condoned the delay.
- Procedural Posture: The appellant challenged the Magistrate's order before the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No. 9119 of 2018, arguing that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance without first condoning the delay. The High Court rejected the petition. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's order.
- Issue: Whether a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, before condoning the delay in filing the complaint, and whether such an irregularity is curable if the delay is subsequently condoned.
- Holding: The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance of the complaint before condoning the delay in its presentation. The Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the complaint.
- Reasoning: The Court relied on the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, which states that cognizance of a complaint may be taken after the prescribed period if the complainant satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The Court emphasized that the satisfaction regarding the cause of delay, resulting in its condonation, must precede the act of taking cognizance. The Court observed that "the power conferred upon the Court to take cognisance of a belated complaint is subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within time." The Court distinguished the High Court's approach, stating that it was "not in keeping with the mandate of the aforestated proviso." The Court also referred to the decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra, reiterating that cognizance under Section 142 of the NI Act is forbidden except upon a complaint made within one month from the date the cause of action accrues.
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