Facts: The appellant filed a complaint alleging sexual assault by three police officers while pursuing a property dispute. After an initial report deemed the allegations untrue, the appellant filed further complaints and an application before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) seeking an FIR against the officers. The JMFC called for a report from the Deputy Inspector General of Police. The appellant then approached the High Court seeking directions for FIR registration, arguing the assaults were not in the discharge of official duties, thus Section 175(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) did not apply.
Procedural Posture: A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that Section 175(4), BNSS compliance was not mandatory as the alleged rape was not in the "discharge of official duties". The JMFC was directed to dispose of the appellant's application, leading to an FIR order. Aggrieved, R-5 (likely one of the accused officers) appealed. A Division Bench allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge's order and the JMFC's FIR order, stating intervention under Article 226 was inappropriate while the JMFC application was pending and the remedy under BNSS was not exhausted. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: 1. Is Section 175(4), BNSS a standalone provision or a proviso to Section 175(3)? 2. What procedure should a judicial magistrate follow when receiving a complaint against a public servant for acts "arising in course of the discharge of his official duties"? 3. Did the Single Judge exceed his jurisdiction by interpreting Section 175(4), BNSS and issuing directions to the JMFC? 4. Did the alleged acts of the public servants fall within the discharge of their official duties?
Holding: The Supreme Court held that Section 175(4), BNSS is not a standalone provision nor a proviso to Section 175(3), but a qualifying procedural layer. The court also held that the Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by granting relief not prayed for and interfering with JMFC proceedings. The court did not answer whether the alleged acts were in discharge of official duties.
Reasoning: The Court reasoned that Section 175(3) vests the power to order investigation in the magistrate, while Section 175(4) provides additional procedural safeguards when the direction concerns a public servant. Both subsections must be read harmoniously, with Section 175(4) understood as a procedural restraint. The court emphasized that the term "complaint" in Section 175(4) must be a written complaint supported by an affidavit, aligning with the safeguards established in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. The court also found that the Single Judge erred by granting relief not specifically sought in the writ petition and by interfering with the JMFC's ongoing proceedings, especially since the JMFC's order calling for a report was a judicial order passed in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 175.