Facts: The Petitioner (Company) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2006 with the Respondents (Jollys) for the surrender of 4.1 acres of land. The MOU contemplated a completion deadline of June 30, 2007, and specifically addressed a potential legal threat from a third party, Jaycee. Clause 2.2(a) provided that if Jaycee obtained an injunction by the deadline, the Company had an option to terminate the MOU within 30 days, failing which the escrowed earnest money would be returned to the Company and the MOU would stand cancelled. Jaycee did file a suit and obtained a status quo order in April 2007. The parties voluntarily extended the timeline for several years while the litigation remained pending. However, in July 2012, after no progress was made in clearing the legal impediment, the Respondents issued a Termination Notice. The Petitioner challenged this termination, seeking specific performance or damages, claiming the "injunction" referred to in the MOU meant a final permanent injunction and that the contract remained subsisting.Procedural Posture: The matter was referred to arbitration, where the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the Company's claims. The Petitioner then filed the present petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to set aside the Arbitral Award.Issue: Whether the Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of the MOU—treating the interim injunction as a triggering event for cancellation and finding the contract incapable of performance—was perverse or patently illegal under Section 34 of the Act.Holding: No, the court declined to interfere. The Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretation was found to be an eminently plausible and logical view.Reasoning: The court reasoned that under Section 34, a court does not sit in appeal and must defer to the Tribunal's interpretation if it is a plausible one. The Tribunal correctly identified that the MOU did not qualify "injunction" as only being "permanent"; thus, an interim status quo order that effectively froze the parties' ability to perform (handing over vacant possession and paying consideration) was sufficient to trigger the contingency clauses. The court noted that the parties were "incapacitated" by the High Court's orders in the Jaycee suit. Furthermore, since the Petitioner was unwilling to take the land on an "as-is-where-is" basis with the litigation risk, they could not insist on keeping the contract in limbo indefinitely. The Respondents were justified in terminating the MOU after waiting a reasonable period (five years) beyond the original deadline.