Facts: New Deluxe Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (Plaintiff) filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against Pemino Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (Defendant) and a declaration that restrictive covenants in indentures from 1943 and 1944 are void. The Plaintiff sought to redevelop its property, but the Defendant claimed a restrictive covenant limited construction to 30 feet. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff's proposed redevelopment breached this covenant.
Procedural Posture: The case involves three interim applications within the suit. Interim Application No. 731 of 2025 was filed by the Plaintiff for interim reliefs to allow redevelopment. Interim Application No. 4573 of 2025 was filed by the Plaintiff for leave to amend the suit plaint under Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Interim Application No. 6242 of 2025 was filed by the Defendant for condonation of delay in filing the written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The court heard all three applications together.
Issue: 1. Is the Plaintiff entitled to interim reliefs allowing redevelopment despite the Defendant's claim of a restrictive covenant limiting construction to 30 feet? 2. Does the restrictive covenant bind the Plaintiff's property and can the Defendant enforce it? 3. Is the suit barred by limitation? 4. Did the Plaintiff suppress material facts, affecting their entitlement to equitable relief?
Holding: Interim Application No. 731 of 2025, filed by the Plaintiff for interim reliefs, is dismissed. Interim Application No. 4573 of 2025, filed by the Plaintiff for leave to amend the plaint, is allowed. Interim Application No. 6242 of 2025, filed by the Defendant for condonation of delay, is allowed.
Reasoning: The Court found that the Plaintiff suppressed material facts regarding the restrictive covenant in its title documents. The Plaintiff initially denied the existence of any restrictive covenant, then shifted its stance to argue that the Defendant lacked the locus to enforce it. The Court held that the restrictive covenant prima facie traveled through successive conveyances and was reflected in the Plaintiff's chain of title. The Court also noted that the Plaintiff derived title under documents that expressly referred to the stipulations, agreements, and restrictions. The Court applied the doctrine of election, stating that a party cannot accept the benefit of a deed while simultaneously disputing a binding condition contained therein. The Court concluded that the balance of convenience did not lie in permitting construction beyond the height restriction at the interim stage, as it would cause irreversible consequences. While the Court acknowledged that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of law and facts, it found that the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff were in the nature of final reliefs and could not be granted at the interim stage.