Facts: In 1958, a landlord named Sadashiv Datar was granted an 88C Certificate under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, which was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court in 1985. Consequently, Datar initiated proceedings under Section 33B of the Act in 1990 for termination of tenancy based on a "bona fide" requirement for personal cultivation. Datar died in 1991, leaving behind two sisters, Lilabai and Kamlabai, who also subsequently passed away. Their heirs (the Petitioners) sought to continue the 1990 proceedings. However, in 2013, the Petitioners sold their entire right, title, and interest in the subject property to third parties on an "as is where is" basis. Despite the sale, they continued to pursue the claim for possession for personal cultivation through the current Writ Petitions.Procedural Posture: The Petitioners challenged an order dated November 30, 2023, passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal ("MRT"). The MRT had reversed a Collector's order that had previously ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The MRT's reversal was based on the premise that the right to terminate tenancy for personal cultivation did not survive the original landlord's death or was otherwise not maintainable by the heirs.Issue: Whether the heirs of a deceased landlord can maintain or revive proceedings for termination of tenancy under Section 33B of the Act when they have unequivocally sold their interest in the subject property to third parties.Holding: No, the Petitions were dismissed. The Court held that once the property was sold to third parties, the foundational requirement of "bona fide" need for personal cultivation by the landlord or his heirs evaporated.Reasoning: The Court reasoned that Section 33B specifically requires the landlord to demonstrate a "bona fide" need for personal cultivation. Even if one assumes that this right is inheritable by the heirs, the heirs must still prove their own personal requirement. By selling the land in 2013, the Petitioners effectively ended any claim of needing the land for their own cultivation. Furthermore, the Court noted that the current proceedings were actually being conducted by third-party transferees through a power of attorney. A Writ Court, exercising discretionary jurisdiction, cannot interfere with an MRT order when the parties seeking relief have already divested themselves of the very interest that formed the basis of the statutory claim.