High Court of Bombay at Goa Rules that the Director of Municipal Administration Cannot Remove Councillors as Quasi-Judicial Powers Vested in the Government Cannot Be Delegated Without Express Statutory Authority.

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Case: JERVIS FERNANDES v. RUMALDO JUDAS AGNELO FERNANDES AND ANR
Court: Bombay High Court
Date: 18-06-2026
Law: Constitution of India.

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In the intricate machinery of local governance, the power to remove an elected representative is perhaps the most potent tool for ensuring accountability. However, a recent judgment by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in the case of Jervis Fernandes v. Rumaldo Judas Agnelo Fernandes serves as a masterclass in the nuances of administrative law, reminding us that "who" exercises power is often as important as the power itself. The case centered on a simple yet profound question: Can a Director of Municipal Administration (DMA) strip a Councillor of their office, or is that a power reserved exclusively for the State Government?

1. The "Government" is a Specific Legal Entity, Not a Generic Label

One of the most impactful takeaways from this judgment is the court's strict interpretation of the term "Government". While we often use the term loosely to describe any state official or department, the law is far more precise. Under the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968, the power to remove a Councillor is vested specifically in the "Government". The court clarified that unless the statute explicitly allows for the delegation of this specific power, a departmental head like the DMA cannot step into the shoes of the Government.

2. Removal from Office is a Quasi-Judicial Act, Not an Administrative One

The judgment draws a sharp line between administrative tasks—like signing a notification or managing a department—and quasi-judicial functions. Removing an elected official involves an inquiry, the appreciation of evidence, and the determination of rights. Because these actions mirror the work of a court, they are "quasi-judicial". The court noted:

"It is settled law, that where a provision of such nature, visits the elected representative with removal and disqualification, such powers... are to be construed to be of judicial or quasi-judicial nature."

This distinction is vital because it triggers higher standards of procedural fairness and limits who can actually make the decision.

3. The Limits of the "Ex-Officio" Title

The Petitioner argued that because the DMA had been appointed as an "Ex-officio Joint Secretary" to the Government, they possessed the inherent power to act as the Government. The court dismantled this argument, explaining that such appointments are often made purely for "secretarial work"—essentially to facilitate the signing of communications and orders after they have been approved by a Minister or the Cabinet. Being a secretary does not automatically grant one the statutory judicial powers of the Government itself.

4. The Power of "Delegatus Non Potest Delegare"

The judgment breathes life into the ancient legal maxim delegatus non potest delegare—the principle that a person to whom power is delegated cannot further delegate that power to someone else. The court emphasized that judicial power, by its very nature, is intended to be exercised by the specific authority named in the statute. To allow such power to be passed around without express legislative permission would undermine the democratic mandate of the law.

"Judicial power cannot ordinarily be delegated unless the law expressly or by clear implication permits it."

5. No "Post Office" Duty for Wrongly Filed Complaints

In a surprising procedural twist, the Petitioner argued that if the DMA didn't have jurisdiction, they should have at least forwarded the complaint to the correct authority (the Government). The court rejected this, holding that an authority is not a "post office". If a litigant chooses the wrong forum, the authority is well within its rights to simply dismiss the matter as non-maintainable. This places the burden of legal diligence squarely on the shoulders of the complainant.

This judgment is a significant reminder that in a constitutional democracy, the "rule of law" is not just about the ends, but the means. By protecting the sanctity of quasi-judicial functions, the court ensures that the removal of elected representatives remains a solemn, high-level act of state, rather than a routine administrative exercise.